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Migrating Towards Minority Status: Shifting
European Policy Towards Roma*
RACHEL GUGLIELMO
Open Society Institute

TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS

University of Mississippi Law School

Abstract
During the 1990s, European policy towards Roma evolved from concern about
migration toward rhetoric about rights. In this article we trace that shift across two
OSCE reports. Following rhetorical-action models, we show how the EU’s commitment
to enlargement and ‘common values’ compelled it to elaborate an internal approach to
minority protection. Concerns about migration persist, but Europe now has to consider
how to integrate Roma as minorities.

Introduction
Roma have wandered the borderlands of social legitimacy since their arrival
in Europe centuries ago. Policies towards Roma in most European states have
long been deﬁned by majorities’ perceptions of Roma as outsiders. Despite a
long history of settlement and co-existence, Roma remain the quintessential
migrant group. Yet since the early 1990s there has been an evolution in European
institutions’ policy towards Roma, from an open concern with the potentially
destabilizing effects of westward migration to an increasing rhetorical emphasis
on discrimination and positive minority rights. In this article, we trace the shift
in two major reports addressing the situation of Roma drafted by one of the
pre-eminent European institutions addressing minority issues during the 1990s,
*
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the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).1 We examine the reasons
why this shift took place and what it has signiﬁed in practical terms for the
Roma and for European minority protection policy more broadly.
Rhetorical-action and deliberative models of policy formation (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Neyer, 2003; Piana, 2004) are followed to demonstrate how
the expansion of the European Union (EU) to include the countries of central
and eastern Europe (CEE) effected a dynamic change in policies towards both
migrants and minorities. The article argues that, although the EU and other
European institutions were initially concerned with externally oriented migration control, the fact that the case for enlargement was articulated in terms of
‘common values’ (Schimmelfennig, 2001) compelled EU Member States to
elaborate a more internally oriented, rights-based approach to minority protection and towards Roma. Concerns about migration, security and integration
that surfaced at the beginning of the accession process persist, but minority
protection has decisively entered European policy and Europe’s self-image.
It will become increasingly necessary to address Romani issues in a different
register; in the light of this, prudent policy will consider not if, but how, Roma
will be integrated into Europe as minorities.
Given their generally extreme marginalization,2 for many Roma a successful
conceptual move from disregarded outsider to constitutive participant – from
migrant to minority – could represent progress, even as material conditions
continue to be extremely difﬁcult for Romani communities in most countries
(EUMAP, 2002). For Europe, a well-articulated minority protection policy
could contribute to greater security and stability. The interaction between
The HCNM reports are a useful framing device for examining trends in European minority policy. First,
the reports were inﬂuential in policy formulation in other institutions: the European Commission relied
on the HCNM and the Council of Europe in preparing its regular reports on accession, for example, while
the HCNM’s 2000 report recommendations formed one of the bases for the guiding principles adopted by
the European Council at Tampere (Cocen Group, 1999). Second, the fact that a single institution produced
these two reports at the beginning and latter stages of the accession process allows us to inquire into ways
in which rhetoric and policy changed and interacted during the 1990s.
2
Nothing in this article assumes a monolithic identity for Europe’s Roma, or for its majority populations.
Some Roma are assimilated, others marginalized; some are poor, others wealthy; some are illiterate, others
have doctorates. When we speak of Roma, we encompass that diversity, allowing that many Roma challenge a common identity and even that ‘Roma’ as a constructed category conceals as much as it explains.
At the same time, nothing is gained by a sterile and paralytically correct formalism that incessantly invokes
heterogeneity against all generalization. Roma are extraordinarily diverse and share certain features about
which we may usefully say certain things, while refusing to do so has costs – making it difﬁcult to say
anything meaningful about discrimination or to derive meaning from the observation that most (though not
all) Roma have dramatically lower levels of education, employment, wealth and life prospects than most
(though not all) members of the majorities with which they live (see Hancock, ‘Foreword’, in Guy, 2001,
p. ix). Finally, it is demonstrable that majority populations do in fact generalize about Roma; this ‘negative’
ascription of common identity has important social and policy implications even if many Roma resist it
(Waters, 1995, pp. 25–6, 39–41; Lucassen et al., 1998, p. 6). However inaccurate such ascription may be,
predictions about policy must take it into account; this article does so.
1
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rhetoric and policy from the early 1990s to the closing days of accession
suggests such expectations are not unwarranted, although policy-makers still
confront questions about the interrelatedness of rights, investment and security
approaches, practical questions about the relationship of those models to
funding priorities, and questions about the role of intention and social attitudes
in shaping policy.
I. Roma: Migrating toward Minority Status
Europe’s highly diverse communities of Roma have been moving from migrant
to minority status only very slowly and with many setbacks. An historical review of policies towards Roma reveals a strong security-oriented bias; though
differing in method, most policies have shared the basic aim of controlling
populations viewed as alien, untrustworthy and destabilizing.
Ancestors of the Roma migrated into Europe from northern India from the
eleventh to the ﬁfteenth centuries. Their origins were unknown to but clearly
distinct from those of the European peoples among whom they settled. Contemporary European images of Roma as permanent migrants may be traced in part
to the hostile response their presence and difference provoked: some observers
have asserted that the mobility and insularity of some Romani communities
has been a way of preserving identity in an uncertain, non-Romani environment (Council of Europe, 1999; Hancock, 1999). At the same time, cultural
differences between Romani and majority communities have prompted some
degree of voluntary separation and have sometimes also given rise to conﬂict
(Pogány, 2004, pp. 26–30; Lucassen et al., 1998, p. 9). Even after permanent
Romani settlements became the norm, especially in central and eastern Europe,
exclusion of the ‘migratory outsider’ remained a self-justifying policy.
When concepts of minority rights gained currency in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries and the inter-war period, some Roma seized the opportunity to organize themselves (Crowe, 1994, p. xiv). However, traditional
minority protection policies were not designed with Roma in mind, and the
beneﬁts Roma derived were peripheral to those policies’ purpose.3 In post-war
socialist systems in particular, Roma – who lacked a kin state – were often
categorized as ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘national’ minorities, a distinction relegating
them to a secondary minority status with less preferential treatment, despite in
many instances being as ‘old’ and long-settled as other communities.4 In any
None of the major instances of minority protection in European history – the Treaty of Westphalia, the
Ottoman millet, the Congress of Vienna, the inter-war minority regimes – afforded rights to Roma, or even
contemplated them as subjects (see Hannum, 1990, pp. 50–4).
4
Inter-war Czechoslovakia’s ‘criterion for recognizing its various ethnic minorities rested upon whether
they were represented by a nation state or not … . Roma did not, despite being one of the largest minority
populations in Czechoslovakia, because there was no Romani homeland’ (Hancock, 1999).
3
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case, the beneﬁts proved an insufﬁcient corrective to dominant perceptions of
Romani difference as a threat, to discrimination and exclusion arising from
that perception, and to policies designed to eliminate that difference or their
presence altogether.5 This context is crucial to understanding the often sceptical stance towards ‘Roma policies’ among Roma, (Council of Europe, 1999,
para. 18) and the emphasis Romani leaders place on meaningful participation
in policy-making processes (Mirga and Gheorghe, 1997; Klimová-Alexander,
2005, pp. 121–3).
II. The HCNM Reports
At the outset of enlargement in the early 1990s the European Community (EC)
had no minority policy of its own. However, EC Member States were concerned
about ethno-national conﬂicts in some CEE candidate states and the possibility
of migration ﬂows into the EC.6 Both issues implicated minority populations.
Lacking a legal and policy framework to address these issues, the EC took two
signiﬁcant steps. First, it included ‘respect for and protection of minorities’
in the Copenhagen criteria for accession adopted by the European Council in
June 1993 (Copenhagen Criteria, 1993, Sec. 7.A.iii). These applied only to
candidates, so the EC was able, at least initially, to develop a minority policy
for candidate states without affecting policy within the EC.
Second, the European Commission relied on the OSCE (formerly the CSCE)
and the Council of Europe (CoE) in developing its policy (Hughes and Sasse,
2003, pp. 7–19; Vermeersch, 2003, p. 8). Both organizations had engaged in a
ﬂurry of standard-setting on minority rights immediately following the fall of
the Berlin Wall,7 and both had focused on applying and implementing these
standards in the CEE region. Resort to these institutions was thus consistent with
and reinforced the EU’s determination to engage minority issues in candidate
states without developing its own minority policy – and its determination to
deal with the question of minorities before accession and outside the Union.
In the past, policies to eliminate Romani difference have included: forced removal of children from
families; criminal penalties for speaking Romanes; citizenship and pass document restrictions; and forced
resettlement and assimilation. Policies to eliminate Roma entirely have included: expulsion and deportation; bounties for killing Roma; forced sterilization; medical experimentation; and the Nazi genocide. For
comprehensive histories of policy towards Roma, see Crowe and Kolsti (1991); Kenrick and Puxon (1972);
for brief surveys, see Kenrick (1998, pp. 1–7); Fraser (2000, pp. 17–31).
6
See Council of the European Community (1991); European Council (1992). The European Community
became the European Union on 1 November 1993.
7
The CSCE became the OSCE on 21 December 1994. The Council of Europe adopted the Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages (CRML) in 1992, Recommendation 1201 (1993) and the Framework
Convention on National Minorities (FCNM) in 1994. The CSCE adopted several documents that addressed
minority issues in general, such as the Charter of Paris (CSCE, 1990a), and Roma in particular, including
the Copenhagen Document (CSCE, 1990b), the Moscow Document (CSCE, 1991a), the Geneva Report
(CSCE, 1991b), and the Helsinki Document (CSCE, 1992).
5
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When the HCNM ﬁrst addressed the situation of Roma in 1993, EU enlargement was just getting underway; western European states were concerned
about the possibility of massive and potentially destabilizing migration by
Roma from CEE states, a concern reﬂected and prioritized in the HCNM’s
report. By 2000, when the HCNM issued his second report on the Roma, CEE
states were just steps away from accession; this second report does not address
migration, instead placing strong emphasis on advancing human rights, ﬁghting
discrimination and promoting effective participation in public life.
The HCNM Report of 1993
By April 1993, only months after the HCNM took ofﬁce,8 the OSCE committee of senior ofﬁcials (on which all EU states are represented) had already
requested him to:
study the social, economic and humanitarian problems relating to the Roma
population in some participating States and the relevance of these problems
to the Mandate of the High Commissioner … and to report thereon to the
Committee of Senior Ofﬁcials through the Chairman-in-Ofﬁce. (HCNM,
1993, p. 2)

This seems a curiously high level of concern, given the HCNM’s mandate for
conﬂict prevention: was an international conﬂict involving Roma imminent,
or were Roma engaging in violent protests that could affect ‘peace, stability
or relations between participating States’?9 In his September 1993 report, the
HCNM seemed to anticipate such questions:
In the discussion [with the Committee], it was furthermore stated that these
problems, which fall into the larger category of migration problems, could also
have an international dimension. (HCNM, 1993, p. 2; emphasis added)

The allusion to internal discussions suggests that concerns about Roma migration from the CEE states into western Europe in fact constituted the primary
motivation behind the Committee’s request.10 This interpretation is borne out by
the report itself. Though going beyond the ‘social, economic and humanitarian’
situation of Roma to discuss discrimination and violence, the report was careful
to present these problems in the light of the Committee’s implicit concern:
The aim, in short, should be to improve the ‘quality of life’ in migrationproducing countries (and areas within those countries) for the sake of such
The ﬁrst HCNM, Max van der Stoel, was appointed in December 1992 and took ofﬁce in January 1993.
The HCNM should ‘provide “early warning”… at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving
national minority issues that have the potential to develop into a conﬂict within the CSCE area, affecting
peace, stability, or relations between participating States’ (CSCE, 1992, emphasis added).
10
Even the formulation concerning migration does not obviously fall within the plain meaning of the HCNM’s
mandate – an example, in a European but non-EU setting, of ‘creeping competence’ (Pollack, 1994).
8
9

© 2005 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

06GuglWat(24)763-86.indd 767

30/9/05 09:15:06

768

RACHEL GUGLIELMO AND TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS

improvements, but also for the reduction in pressures on international migration. In addition to commerce, investment, and development assistance leading
to economic opportunity, efforts at addressing the speciﬁc problems of the
Roma, including discrimination and violence against them, will contribute
considerably to improving their ‘quality of life.’ Such efforts are likely to
encourage people to continue their lives where they already are. (HCNM,
1993, p. 11, emphasis added) 11

Formally, the report addressed all OSCE states. However, it focused on
‘migration-producing countries’, even though similar patterns of exclusion,
violence and discrimination could have been traced in western European
countries (EUMAP, 2002; ERRC, 1996, 2000, 2003); it advised countries on
the receiving end of migration to ensure they had humane refugee policies
(HCNM, 1993, pp. 14–15). The report clearly responds to the Committee’s
underlying interest: not conﬂict prevention, but migration prevention.
In several respects, however, the HCNM went beyond a narrow interpretation of the Committee’s interests, contributing to important changes in the way
minority issues would come to be spoken of in European institutions. First, the
fact that the Roma – as noted above, traditionally an ‘ethnic minority’ – were
the subject of a report by the High Commissioner on National Minorities sent
a strong signal that there would not be any distinction in treatment accorded
to ethnic as opposed to national minority groups – at least in the CEE region.
This approach already prevailed in theory (Capotorti, 1979, p. 119) but, in
practice, classiﬁcation of Roma as an ethnic minority had continued in many
CEE states12 and some EU members as well.13 Partly due to pressure from the
HCNM and other European institutions, such distinctions have been eliminated
from most CEE Roma and minority policies.
Second, though the Committee had requested assessment of the ‘social,
economic and humanitarian problems’ of Roma, the 1993 report also showed
how Romani migration could be triggered by civil and political rights violations
as well as socio-economic marginalization and recommended ‘implementation
of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights and the strengthening of
democratic institutions and the rule of law’ (HCNM, 1993, p. 14). These issues
were also placed in the context of migration; still, by highlighting ‘rights’ as
well as ‘problems’, the report presented Roma as rights-bearing individuals
The report also notes that, in addition to economic opportunity, ‘quality of life’ includes an ‘enduring sense
of belonging’ and ‘greater conﬁdence in the capacity of government authorities to protect human rights,
ensure the rule of law, and promote tolerance and understanding within the society-at-large … ’.
12
For example, Hungary abolished this distinction only with its 1993 minorities law; the February 1992
draft still maintained the distinction and was withdrawn only following opposition from minority groups
(Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1996, p. 111).
13
Italy and Spain continue to deny Roma preferential treatment on a par with that accorded to national
minority groups, despite the historical presence of large numbers of Roma on their territories (EUMAP,
2002). However, these western European countries were not the focus of the HCNM’s attention in 1993.
11
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and communities rather than merely as a generalized social or security concern.
At the same time, it reinforced the idea that human and minority rights issues
within a given country could be understood consistently with, even as part of,
Europe’s security architecture.
Finally, the HCNM’s report alluded to the importance of involving Roma
in policy-making (HCNM, 1993, pp. 9, 14). Though not described in minority rights terms, this constituted implicit recognition of Romani communities’
entitlement to a right historically attached to national minority regimes – political participation (FIER, 1999) – and contributed to the development of a new
rhetorical approach to Roma as integrated, politically empowered actors.
Still, having issued his report, the HCNM did not follow the situation of
Roma systematically; indeed, he made only one public reference to the Roma
in the next six years (HCNM, 1994). This may have been due in part to the
HCNM’s concern about ‘involv[ing himself] in only those situations that meet
the criteria of the mandate’ (HCNM 1993, p. 13). This concern was reﬂected
in his recommendation that ‘a point of contact for Roma issues’ be created
within the ofﬁce of democratic initiatives and human rights (HCNM, 1993, p.
15), with the suggestion that its human rights-based mandate might be more
appropriate for addressing the problems faced by Romani communities. Clearly,
there were competing visions within European institutions as to whether the
problems of Roma were a security issue, a social issue, or a rights issue, or
indeed what the proper relationship between security, socio-economic reform,
and rights is for policy addressing marginalized groups.
Indeed, it is worth asking why European institutions approached the HCNM
about a migration problem unrelated to conﬂict in the ﬁrst place. Seeing a
problem, but seeing also that it related to an ethnic group, the OSCE turned to
the one institution dealing expressly with minority issues. In so doing, what had
initially been primarily a concern about migration was in part transformed into,
or at least addressed as, a human rights issue. Despite the HNCM’s mandate
conservatism, he did address the issue, establishing a set of institutional and
rhetorical expectations about migration and minorities. In 2000 he returned
to this question.
The HCNM Report of 2000
By 2000 the context within which the HCNM was operating had changed
dramatically. The EU enlargement process had replaced the OSCE and CoE at
the centre of debates about the eastward expansion of Europe, and an at least
rhetorical commitment to ‘common values’ and integration appeared to have
replaced the preoccupation with security and the potential for ethnic conﬂict
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that had dominated the early 1990s.14 The genesis of the 2000 report reﬂects
this change in context. In contrast to the 1993 report, presented as the fulﬁlment
of an assignment from the committee of senior ofﬁcials, the HCNM offered
this justiﬁcation for undertaking the 2000 report of his own volition:
As time passed, I noted in many parts of Europe the persistent plight of the
Roma and Sinti … [who] were generally left outside the scope and beyond
the reach of progressive developments. Moreover, the persistence of raciallymotivated hatred and violence directed against the Roma and Sinti can only
be considered a blight on the records of individual participating States and of
European society in general. … My intention in embarking upon this study
was … principally to raise the awareness of policy makers to the particular
situation and needs of Roma and Sinti, to focus debate on their conditions, and
to offer some general recommendations … I hope that in the new millennium
all OSCE participating States will prove fully responsive to the needs of Roma
and Sinti and wholly respectful of their rights. As a community of values, the
OSCE must assure this for all. (HCNM, 2000, emphasis added)

Concerns about whether or not the situation of Roma fell within his mandate
evidently did not prevent the HCNM from revisiting the issues he had raised
in 1993. But his justiﬁcation also suggests two important changes marked by
the 2000 report: in geographic focus, and in the balance between security and
rights. The 2000 report explores the situation of Roma and Sinti in ‘many parts
of Europe’ – that is, in western Europe as well as the CEE region. By 2000
the HCNM was asserting that ‘discrimination and exclusion are fundamental
features of the Roma experience’ and that all OSCE Member States, ‘as a
community of values’ had a democratic obligation to take corrective measures
on human rights grounds (HCNM, 2000, Foreword 1).
The HCNM’s 2000 recommendations also offer a comprehensive vision
of individual and minority rights, calling for more effective protection against
racial violence and discrimination, as well as opportunities to cultivate a distinct Romani identity. The HCNM refers to OSCE documents to bolster his
recommendation that Roma be integrally involved, as Roma, in developing
policies that affect them (HCNM, 2000, pp. 7–9). And although there is much
more discussion of rights, there is no reference to migration.15
The difference in tone and substance is striking – the 2000 report is 175
pages long, as compared to just 18 pages in 199316 – begging the question of
The broader security situation had changed dramatically: in 1993, war was still raging in Bosnia and the
Transdniestria conﬂict had only recently subsided. By 2000, the former Yugoslavia was largely at peace,
and the geopolitical uncertainty of the immediate post-cold war had receded considerably.
15
Perhaps as a corollary to this, the 2000 report also places relatively less emphasis on socio-economic
issues; one commentator refers to the report’s ‘reluctance to examine economic aspects of the Roma as a
policy subject’ (Kovats, in Guy, 2001, p. 99).
16
The United States Department of State provided substantial funding to support research for the 2000
report, which may in part explain its greater length.
14

© 2005 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

06GuglWat(24)763-86.indd 770

30/9/05 09:15:07

SHIFTING EUROPEAN POLICY TOWARDS ROMA

771

what had changed. Was Roma migration really no longer an issue? Had human
and minority rights been accepted as an integral component of an expanded
notion of security? And had ensuring a better situation for Roma really become
a requirement for membership of the European community of values?
From 1993 to 2000: The Dynamic between Rhetoric and Policy
To answer these questions, we should consider the divergent policy approaches
advocated by EU institutions during the period of these reports. These approaches – human rights implementation, socio-economic investment, and
migration prevention – appear on a spectrum from highly rhetorical value
commitments to the rational defence of interests.
First, the Copenhagen criteria were adopted in June 1993, at the same time
as the HCNM was working on his ﬁrst report. The choice to identify political
criteria including ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ as a condition of
accession placed the EU in a delicate position: candidates were to be measured
against a standard of minority protection for which there was no foundation in
EU law, no deﬁnition, no monitoring mechanism, and widely varying practice
between Member States (Hughes and Sasse, 2003, pp. 12–13). Nevertheless,
once set, this criterion somehow needed to be assessed for candidates to gain
admission to a community that itself neither knew what the standard meant
nor applied it to its own members.
Perhaps cognizant of these difﬁculties, the Commission asserted in the
ﬁrst regular reports on progress towards accession in 1998 that the political
criteria had been met in nine of the ten CEE candidates.17 Although ‘meeting
the criteria’ implied a one-time assessment, the Commission continued to
monitor candidates on minority protection and the other criteria. The 1999 accession partnerships speciﬁed ‘integration’ of Roma as a priority for Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia,18 and the Commission
devoted a considerable part of its regular reports’ ‘minority rights’ section to
Roma, detailing infringements of their civil, political, economic and social
rights, but making no reference to migration.
Second, in 1998 the Directorate-General on Enlargement began allocating
signiﬁcant assistance to ‘Roma minorities programmes’, primarily in Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, through its Phare programme.19 Presumably, this funding was intended to support candidate states
in addressing some of the problems identiﬁed in the regular reports. However,
Slovakia did not receive a positive assessment until 1999, after the Mečiar government had lost power.
See accession partnerships at «http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/aps.htm».
19
These were the ﬁve candidates with the largest Roma populations. ‘Integration of Roma’ had been identiﬁed as a priority in the accession partnerships concluded in 1999. Phare also supported programmes for the
Kirtimai Roma community in Lithuania.
17
18
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rather than dealing with minority protection or rights, ‘most Phare programmes
were developed as socio-economic interventions designed to deal with some
aspects of the social exclusion experienced by many Roma minority populations’ (European Commission Evaluation Unit, 2004, p. 1). A signiﬁcant
percentage of Phare funding supported equipment purchases or infrastructure
development (particularly in isolated Romani communities) or ‘social integration’ (European Commission Evaluation Unit, 2004, pp. 63–4).
The EU’s evaluation criticizes Phare programmes’ lack of a ‘well-informed,
clear vision or goal to deﬁne exactly what Roma inclusion means and how
this will be achieved’; the Phare programmes appear to have been developed
without reference to the CoE and HCNM’s rights-based articulations of Romani
interests. Overall, the Phare programme’s funding pattern suggests an identiﬁcation of Roma minority issues with socio-economic concerns and a persistent
if unvoiced preoccupation with migration – a conclusion supported by the
comments of CEE ofﬁcials20 and parallel patterns of bilateral assistance.21
Third, migration concerns surfaced more openly within the Commission’s
Directorate-General on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which channelled
considerable assistance to candidate states to tackle customs, border security
and control, and migration issues. For example, between 1998–2002 the Odysseus programme funded a range of exchanges, training and research projects
on asylum and immigration,22 including an examination of ‘Current Irregular
Migration of Roma to the Member States’ by the International Centre for
Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).23
That project’s report reveals persistent concerns about Roma as migrants.
The project was motivated by the ‘increased number of asylum requests by
citizens from European states that are considered to be safe and are to become
EU Members’ and aimed to
analyse the background to these recent ﬂows … to ﬁnd out which measures
can be taken to avoid them and how to react when they take place, without
The Czech Human Rights Commissioner suggested this reading of EU motivation in supporting a policy
to improve the situation for Roma: ‘It can be expected that the result of this social ediﬁcation of the hitherto
marginalised Romany community and the gradual formation of an emancipated Romany minority will lead to
a perceptible fall in Romany migration to European Union countries’ (cited in Vermeersch, 2003, p. 24).
21
For example, a government programme to improve the situation for Roma in the Małopolska region of
Poland stated that: ‘the situation of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe is a matter of special interest to
European institutions and the European Member States, which results mainly from fears of migration. This
was clearly demonstrated in bilateral contacts with, inter alia, British, Finnish and Irish authorities during
the last two years’ (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, ‘Pilot Government Programme for the
Roma Community in the Małopolska Province for the years 2001–2003’, February 2001, cited in EUMAP,
2001, p. 378, fn. 159).
22
See «http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/project/odysseus/index_en.htm».
23
The project also received funding from the governments of Norway, Switzerland and the UK (see ICMPD,
2001, p. 4; Commission Report to the Parliament, 2000, p. 51).
20
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compromising the existing asylum procedures or putting a strain on relations
with Candidate States by imposing visa obligations. (ICMPD, 2001, p. 4)

The ICMPD report suggests that Roma were migrating ‘mainly for economic
reasons … and therefore host countries regard this to be an abuse of the asylum
system’24 and regrets the ‘damag[e] to the EU association process’ caused by
the resulting imposition of visa regimes on migration-producing countries. Improving the situation for Roma is presented as a means of eliminating the ‘push
factors’ that contribute to migration (ICMPD, 2001, p. 36). The report suggests that restrictive policies are necessary and justiﬁed to deter bogus asylum
applicants (pp. 19–25), but downplays possible human rights implications.25
Consistent with the report’s logic, migration concerns have led individual EU
Member States to adopt highly restrictive immigration policies clearly aimed
at discouraging the entry of Roma.26 Around the time the 2000 HCNM report
was issued, then, Roma migration continued to be a concern for many Member
States – a concern that could trump human rights.
Thus perhaps the greatest shift between 1993 and 2000 was towards a compartmentalization of functions and an increased rhetorical sophistication, rather
than any consensus on the underlying conceptualizations of policy. European
institutions recognized Roma as a minority, referred to the rights dimension of
their situation, and responded to the socio-economic marginalization of Roma
with increased investment.27 Yet to the extent that they continued to migrate
westwards, or were thought likely to, Roma were still seen as a ‘problem’,
albeit one preferably resolved by persuading them to stay where they were
rather than by resort to explicitly anti-immigration measures that could damage
the EU’s image as a ‘community of values’.
For a contrasting view, see CoE (1999, paras 51–2), noting that migration of Roma is spurred by both ‘a
strong attitude of non-conﬁdence and non-identiﬁcation with the majority and its institutions in the respective countries of origin’ and ‘strong external features … such as organised and repeated hostilities, single
acts of violence …, or change of status due to the emergence of new states or new citizenship provisions’.
It emphasizes that Roma migration is ‘proportionally no higher than the average migration to Western
Europe [from CEE] countries’.
25
For instance, the report comments on the ‘dramatic’ effect (in terms of decrease in asylum applications)
of the deportation of 74 Romani asylum-seekers from Belgium in October 1999, but does not mention that
this occurred despite a request for a stay by the European Court of Human Rights. In 2002, the Court ruled
that the deportation had violated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 2002).
26
For example, in 2001, the British Home Ofﬁce concluded an agreement with the Czech government
allowing ‘pre-screening’ of passengers by British immigration ofﬁcials in Prague’s airport to turn back
suspected asylum claimants; one investigation found that Roma were 400 times more likely to be turned
back. The Law Lords ruled that this system ‘was inherently and systemically discriminatory on racial
grounds against Roma, contrary to section 1(1)(a) of the Race Relations Act’ (House of Lords, 2004).
Interestingly, the HCNM, in his 1993 report, had anticipated that this type of problematic situation might
arise (HCNM, 1993, p. 13).
27
The European Council at Tampere signalled support for the HCNM’s recommendations by adopting them
together with the recommendations of the CoE’s specialist group, giving them added weight in EU policy
and programming (Cocen Group, 1999).
24
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These factors point up a disjunction between the EU’s rhetorical commitments, on the one hand, and its motivations in allocating resources to prevent
migration, on the other. Similarly, its insistence on respect for minority rights
in candidate states was not grounded in internal EU standards and policies,
which contradicted its commitment to common values. The ‘cognitive dissonance’ created by this disjunction may have undermined the legitimacy
and efﬁcacy of EU policies towards minorities and Roma in particular.28 As
the day of accession grew closer, the question became increasingly salient of
what would happen when candidates were transformed into members – and
their Romani populations into citizens – of an EU with no clear policies for
minority protection.
III. The EU: Migrating towards a Union Minority Policy
Civil society groups and Romani leaders have seized on the gaps between
rhetoric and reality to press for a more coherent minority protection policy,
inside and outside the Union. Having put the issue of minority protection on
the agenda for accession, EU states were in effect ‘entrapped’ (Schimmelfennig, 2001), ﬁnding it embarrassing not to look at these issues within the EU.
Indeed, the draft Constitutional Treaty incorporated the Copenhagen minority
protection criterion for all Member States (Draft Constitutional Treaty, 2003,
Art. I-2). In a sense, this ‘entrapment’ represents the unexpected consequences
of an idea, yet this was not merely rhetoric shaping reality: without the underlying interest in security – concerning migration but also the integrity of
the inter-state project – and the existence of other European norms of process
and equality, the rhetorical pull of minority protection might well have faded
with accession. Even now, the normative pull of minority rights within the EU
is limited in scope.29
Yet despite the tensions between security, socio-economic and rights perspectives, with the publication of the HCNM’s 2000 report, Roma and other
minorities acquired powerful rhetorical tools to argue for their claims as communities. Rights organizations were able to articulate the case for minority
protection in terms of process and basic fairness: if respect for and protection
of minorities was a criterion, its substance in law and policy would have to
be articulated. If minority protection was to be applied in candidate states as
a criterion of membership, why not in members as well? Would not ongoing
See Schimmelfennig (2001). Many commentators have questioned the extent to which the emphasis placed
on improving the situation for Roma in the accession process has in fact led to meaningful improvements in
most CEE Romani communities (see HCNM, 2000; EUMAP, 2002; Kovats, 2003; Guy, 2001).
29
Contrast the limited commitment to minority protection in the draft Constitutional Treaty with the strong
anti-discrimination standards of the race equality directive of 2000.
28
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monitoring to forestall backsliding be of use in Member States as well as
candidates?30
Some Roma political and community leaders pressed critiques mobilizing
these various policy strands to address institutional concern about migration
with a distinct orientation towards rights; for example the 2003 collective
declaration of Romani associations noted that:
migration is often a sign and symptom of a lack of equal opportunity at
home, in terms of education, employment, housing, health, credit and public
services. We note lately manifestations of discrimination against Roma in
both their home countries and ‘host countries’ concerning the freedom of
circulation in the time of an [sic] uniﬁed Europe. Rules established between
candidate countries and Member States of the European Union are applied
in a discriminatory way. If we agree with combating illegal migration, this
kind of migration, which is not so widespread among Roma, only could be
reduced when the livelihood of all citizens is guaranteed at home. We recognise racism and discrimination as the underlying cause of the inequality
suffered by Roma across Europe. (Collective Declaration, 2003)

This kind of critique unites calls for equal process across the European space
with concerns about economic conditions and exclusion. Moreover, in the
declaration Romani activists stake claims not for economic transfers but for
initiatives to promote social integration and ‘stronger effort to fully involve
Roma in democratic processes’ (Collective Declaration, 2003, Point 3).31 The
move by Romani leaders to include rights claims alongside resource transfers
was not solely a product of policy disputes between European elites. To be
sure, the increased activism of Romani organizations since the end of the
communist period might well have proceeded – and focused on Europe and
discrimination – without the rhetorical tensions created by European institutions’ parallel policies;32 indeed, Romani activism itself helped channel the
focus and activities of European institutions.33 Yet the tensions arising out
of the accession project probably increased the scope of action for Romani

See, e.g., EU Network of Independent Experts (2003, p. 174) (criticizing the failure of Member States
to ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities ‘although according to the
criteria of Copenhagen, the ratiﬁcation of the Framework Convention is a condition imposed on the States
who have applied to join the European Union’) (EUMAP, 2002, Overview).
31
The declaration calls for: funding for legal representation, voter education and registration; integration
of Roma into mainstream media and expansion of Romani press centres; support for Roma to study law;
and Romani universities (Collective Declaration, 2003, Points 1, 3, 4, 5, 6a–b).
32
‘Roma activists and intellectuals are beginning to work together to create a network of groups and organisations which can tap into the corridors of power in the European Union in an effort to improve the social,
economic and political situation of Roma in Europe’ (Gheorghe, 1991, pp. 840–4, cited in Clark).
33
See, e.g., Russinov (2002, pp. 188–90 ), discussing interactions with the Council of Europe and the European
Roma Rights Centre in the work of a Roma coalition to deﬁne anti-discrimination policy in Bulgaria.
30
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groups, and over time it deﬁned the most productive and compelling forms
their message could take.
Institutional actors were also aware of the problems a double standard
posed and the opportunities it created for change within the Union. In 2002,
the HNCM34 noted that accession’s normative commitments had improved
the position of minorities in the candidate states and that these commitments
could not be conﬁned to the accession period:
[O]ver the past decade, the incentive of living up to the Copenhagen criteria
has been an important impetus for the governments of applicant States to adopt
or improve policies and laws to protect and promote the rights of persons
belonging to national minorities. … This leads me to a point which I believe
needs to be seriously considered. … What are the EU’s own standards when
it comes to the protection of national minorities? It is clear that the Copenhagen criteria are important for clearing the bar to get into the EU, but what
happens when you have passed that hurdle? Do the rules change? Surely the
standards on which the Copenhagen criteria are based should be universally
applicable. … Otherwise, the relationship between the existing and aspiring
EU Members States [sic] would be unbalanced in terms of applicable standards. I believe such an imbalance would also be inconsistent with declared
EU values and raise serious doubts about the normative foundations of the
EU itself. (HCNM 2002, p. 4)

Prior to the accession process, these ‘normative foundations’ had not encompassed minority protection. Externally oriented security concerns prompted
the initial pronouncement of minority protection; internally oriented norms
of equality subsequently made it difﬁcult to prevent minority protection from
encompassing Member States as accession became an imminent reality. Once
the new states joined, the Union’s own logic required they not be subject to
radically different norms, but the only other coherent solution – abandonment of the Copenhagen criteria – would have made the double standard all
too apparent and risked the gains minority protection outside the Union were
thought to have achieved. Instead, progressive extension of minority protection
norms to all Member States provides a way to meet the concerns of various
actors: those concerned with migration as a security issue, those with rights
or socio-economic orientations, and those concerned with the EU’s integrity
as a normative project.
The Migration of Policy after Accession
Concern with migration drove much of European policy towards Roma in the
1990s. Yet with accession, the social, rights, and security issues surrounding
34

Rolf Ekeus replaced Max van der Stoel as HCNM in July 2001.
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Roma became internal issues.35 With accession, a Union whose members had
gone to great lengths to restrict Roma migration now on a single day admitted
over a million Roma, who have become both citizens of the Union and members
of its largest minority. Even if Europe has principally been concerned with
Romani migration, with accession it has become apparent that a migration
model is insufﬁcient. The EU’s fundamental equality norms mean that simply
by staying where they are – and in the conditions in which many of them live
– Roma have become a concern for an EU that has come to them.
Movement of Roma from one EU Member State to another is now difﬁcult
either to restrict or to classify as a ‘problem’, since that movement is protected
by fundamental EU norms (Braham and Braham, 2000, pp. 105–10). Yet, while
accession has altered the legal and political framework of possibility relating
to minorities and migration, it has not altered the underlying security and
social integration concerns that drove pre-accession policy. Since accession
has made direct restrictions on migration by EU citizens all but impossible,
the tools available to address continuing concerns about Roma migration have
changed, though the concern has not.36
For example, during the accession period several Member States took
measures to restrict asylum applications by Roma from CEE countries. With
accession, freedom of movement makes asylum moot, and in any event an
asylum claim originating in another Member State would represent a serious
crisis for the Union, since it would necessarily imply a failure to uphold the
core political criteria underpinning membership.37 Yet the underlying socioeconomic situation and rights of Roma in the CEE states have not necessarily
improved – these issues have been internalized with no new mechanism being
put in place to respond to them except the norms of minority protection (Braham
and Braham, 2000, pp. 106–10). Thus, the fact that the UK can no longer deny
immigration to Czech Roma38 or that Belgium cannot return Roma asylum
applicants (Cahn and Vermeersch, 2000) does not mean that the perceived
economic burdens, social disruptions or security concerns underlying earlier
restrictions will not sound in domestic British or Belgian policies. Accession
Transitional restrictions on free movement will continue, but with a clear timeline for their termination,
after which CEE citizens will have identical movement rights as other EU citizens (see Rigo, 2005, pp.
16–17).
36
This concern is not necessarily well founded. Only 15 per cent of migrants into the EU since 1989 have
been from the CEE states (Zielonka, 2001, p. 520), and migration of Roma has not been signiﬁcantly higher
than that of non-Roma (Matras, 2000, p. 47). There is also reason to suppose westward migration will not
dramatically increase with accession (Kraus and Schwager, 2003).
37
The concept that EU membership makes asylum claims moot presupposes a minimum level of common
political commitment by each Member State; failure to meet such a minimum could elicit a response by the
EU or other Member States, as happened with Austria after the Freedom Party entered government.
38
As noted above, the Law Lords have recently held against this practice on human rights grounds (House
of Lords, 2004) but, even if they had not, it would have been unavailable as a matter of policy after
accession.
35
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has limited members’ options for excluding Roma at their borders, but the
concerns that motivated such policies will persist and seek other outlets.39
Even if Roma do not migrate, their exclusion and impoverishment pose
different policy challenges for a Union that must now deal with them as citizens and minorities. Roma populate the whole taxonomy both of minorities
– cultural, social, political – and of migrants – political, economic, and (for
those from outside the EU) illegal.40 The development of minority policy, at
least as regards Roma, was governed by a particular conjunction of persistent
concerns about migration and the implications of impending citizenship for
large numbers of Roma, and it is not clear that the lesson is replicable for true
migrant groups. The many connections between migrant and minority – the
sense of difference, the fact that migrants often form new minorities – coexist
with a practical hierarchy between the two, a passage from an impermanent,
marginal status to membership. For all the problems that attach to minority
status, it is often an improvement on the prospects confronting the migrant. We
may expect some members of recent migrant communities, such as Muslims,
to resist being consigned to a ‘permanent migrant’ status. The project of integrating different communities is still very much seen as a security issue for the
Union; in the same speech in which he discussed the need for common norms,
the HCNM warned of the dangers should such normative integration fail:
[D]iscrimination, racism, intolerance and xenophobia not only persist across
Europe, but in some cases are gaining strength. It is also clear that such ideas
remain powerful mobilizing agents for populists, and that EU membership
provides no immunity in this regard. In particular, religious intolerance
– especially anti-Semitism and Islamophobia – have not abated and could
open ﬁssures within our societies. These are issues that Europe must address
in order to prevent intra-State cleavages from cracking the bigger inter-State
project. (HCNM, 2002, p. 7)

Conclusion: A Balanced Policy for the Union?
Contrary to many observers’ expectations, it is the Union that has migrated,
while most Roma have stayed where they are. What would constitute a policy
responsive to the range of concerns – security, social integration, equality,
human and minority rights, the Union’s integrity – that the continuing social
and economic exclusion of Roma implicates? Many observers critical of
anti-migration policies tend to advocate either a rights-based or a socioThese policy instruments will still be available against Roma or other migrants from non-Member States,
which are likely to continue to be seen predominantly as a security concern and treated as such. Concern with
mass immigration has encouraged discrimination in old Member States, and can be expected to do the same
in the CEE states as they increasingly receive migration as well as produce it (Mudde, 2005, p. 184).
40
See taxonomies outlined in the introduction to this special issue.
39
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economic alternative. Yet, it seems clear that rights, investment and security
are interrelated, and that a single-minded focus on any one aspect in isolation
is insufﬁcient and may actually produce harmful policy outcomes. Exclusive
concern with security can excuse abuses of communities already pressed
to the margins, yet ignoring societies’ legitimate concern with stability and
prosperity in the face of population movements or assertions of difference is
not realistic either. Similarly, relying on humanitarianism to underpin human
rights or social investment may not be as effective as linking those policies to a
security interest in restricting migration; on the other hand, securitizing social
and rights commitments can reduce support for them when the underlying
security concerns are met. There are also perverse incentives in an unbalanced
approach: for example, favouring collective rights over investment could lower
the ﬁnancial cost of addressing Romani issues, while delivering fewer economic
goods to individual Roma who confront both discriminatory exclusion and
poverty.
An exclusive focus on collective rights risks ghettoizing Roma politics,
reducing access to public services and excluding Roma from effective participation. It could provoke a reaction from majorities if funding is earmarked for the
minority. Identifying all Roma as a single community may be a rational policy
choice, but Roma from different parts of Europe have highly diverse languages
and cultures, and it would not be obvious to many Roma communities that they
share a single identity; many would oppose homogenization (Marushiakova
and Popov, in Guy, 2001, pp. 33–50). Conversely, collective politics could give
Roma greater bargaining power, and the social marginalization Roma already
suffer is so pervasive that it is not clear further ghettoization would occur.
A balanced policy would have to address the high unemployment, low
education and socio-economic marginalization that affect Roma. Even if
pervasive majority prejudice could be reversed, individual Roma would still
be in extremely disadvantaged positions demanding attention and investment
from EU institutions whether or not they move west. Yet the socio-economic
problems confronting Roma, important as they are, cannot be separated from
that broader context of pervasive discrimination (Waters and Guglielmo, 1996,
p. 297). It is an open question if any policy can affect discriminatory attitudes,
yet precisely because there is little reason to think that majority attitudes can
be ameliorated in the near term, we believe that increased support for political participation by Roma, as Roma and citizens, holds the most promise of
effecting change and combating harm. Politically empowered communities
are better able to deﬁne and defend their own interests, even in absence of
agreement on effective policy measures (Piana, 2004, pp. 34–6). Alongside
rights commitments, therefore, such a policy would prioritize investments in
effective political participation, such as literacy and education, rather than in
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wealth creation. Given the determinative role of majority prejudice, an effective
policy would also have to begin to identify common interests in security and
in the success of the integrative Union project, by seeking to demonstrate to
majorities their interest, with minorities, in protection of cultural differences
and in assuring each community’s participation in policy-making within a
Union that has no majority.
In practice, this ‘constitutive and participatory approach’ implies greater
attention to constructing policy in co-ordination with minority communities,
an approach embodied in the recommendations of the CoE’s specialist group,
which emphasize the importance of Romani involvement in community affairs, rights monitoring, political processes and institutions (CoE, 1999, paras
57–9).41 Those recommendations also note that efforts to ‘prevent … the causes
of migration … need to concentrate more speciﬁcally on conﬂict prevention
if they are to remove the causes for non-conﬁdence and non-identiﬁcation of
Roma in mainstream societies in the countries of origin’ (CoE, 1999, para.
54). A balanced policy thus has to combat prejudice, promote investment in
Romani individuals and communities, and support collective identity and
participation. Yet it will have to do so in a fashion not principally motivated
by a desire to suppress migration.
The 1993 HCNM report suggests a European policy preoccupied, not with
ameliorating socio-economic marginalization for the sake of excluded populations, or even for the health of the societies in which they live, but with forestalling undesired migration for the sake of the recipient countries. Whatever
rhetorical and policy shifts we may identify in the 2000 HCNM report, there
is little indication that this preoccupation has changed (Matras, 2000, p. 47). It
is an interesting theoretical question how much intentionality matters in policy
formulation, but common sense suggests that underlying intentions may affect
resource commitments at the margins in policy implementation.
Rhetorical-action or deliberative theories suggest that actors’ choices produce outcomes that lower the cognitive dissonance between their public commitments and their individual preferences (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Neyer, 2003;
Piana, 2004). If this is right, the process is surely iterative: not only policy, but
understandings of the purposes of policy and its implementation are shaped in
this fashion. When the implementation of a policy itself comes into tension with
public value commitments, cognitive dissonance will generate another round of
adjustment. Over time, it is difﬁcult to imagine that investment policies whose
effective purpose is to discourage exercise of a right of free movement will
always choose what is best for the ﬂourishing of individuals and communities,
rather than what is best for discouraging their movement.
41

The specialist group is led by and has substantive participation by Romani experts.
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Whatever their formal consistency with the acquis communautaire, policies
designed to discourage freedom of movement do not seem compatible with the
fundamental commitments, the ‘common values,’ of the Union. At the least,
such policies suggest a different Union, one in which identity and community
are protected as much by separation as by integration. That may be an acceptable vision – and many aspects of the present European project suggest it is
– but it may not serve the interests of individuals and communities such as the
Roma who do not form a majority in any one Member State.
There is reason to expect that minority protection will remain on the agenda
and increasingly be interpreted as a rights issue, albeit one with an important
security and integrative component. The concerns that led Member States to
elevate minority protection to a priority of the Union in the early 1990s combine
with the logic and processes of membership to create an opening for minorities
to advance their agenda in a way states will ﬁnd difﬁcult to contain. Minority
rights, like rights generally, have proved a rhetorical stimulus to policy change.
As Landau (2004) argues:
The EU cannot remain ambiguous forever, because an integrated Europe
precisely requires new understandings of how states and societies relate to
each other. It may take several years before the EU is pushed to standardize
minority rights, but the seeds of minority activism at the supranational level
have already been planted by currently vague strategies of interpreting and
implementing minority rights. … [T]he more groups that are incorporated
under EU auspices and the more diverse the European Union becomes, the
more difﬁcult it will be to ignore the gap between minority rights rhetoric
and state’s obligations to uphold minority rights.

Given the seriousness of the problems Romani communities throughout Europe
continue to confront, rhetorical and conceptual advancements may seem cold
comfort. Yet precisely because the real solutions to the problems that confront
Roma may lie, not in anti-discrimination directives, social investment strategies,
or the articulation of rights, but in changing attitudes among majorities, the
change may be critical: no longer seen and spoken of as if they were migrants,
Roma may ﬁnally be arriving as European minorities.
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